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Abstract 
The case for the greater use of narrative disclosures within the annual report 
package continues to attract support from accounting academics. After a decade of 
comparatively limited attention, the topic of narrative reporting has returned to the 
accounting research agenda, in part in association with integrated reporting and a 
growing interest in accounting for business models, as well as a resurgence of 
intellectual capital research. In the light of a continuing optimism that narrative 
reporting will eventually assume its rightful place within financial reporting, the paper 
reports and reflects upon the findings of a study of the outcome of the Danish 
Guideline Project in the decade following its conclusion in late 2002. This initiative 
placed a heavy emphasis on the extension of narrative reporting in its principal 
output, the Intellectual Capital Statement, still widely regarded as a highly promising 
intellectual capital reporting framework. Based on insights derived from the study, 
the paper identifies a number of major obstacles that confront the advocates of 
narrative disclosure practices, the persistence of which is rooted in the contestable 
jurisdiction that characterises the accountancy profession itself.  
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 1.  Introduction 
The topic of narrative reporting has recently returned to the accounting research 
agenda, following a short period of less attention. Its re-emergence is closely related 
to the growing interest in integrated reporting (IR) (BIS, 2010; IIRC, 2011, 2012, 
2013), within which narrative reporting has a major role to play, including in 
connection with the business model that is identified as being central to this 
approach to business reporting (EFRAG, 2010; ICAEW, 2010; Haslam et al, 2012; 
Leisenring et al, 2012; Beattie and Smith, 2013). Narrative reporting also played a 
significant role within the intellectual capital statement (ICS) reporting framework that 
emerged from the Danish Guideline Project (DGP) (1997-2002) (DATI, 2000; 
Mouritsen et al, 2001, 2003). The ICS continues to attract critical acclaim within 
sections of the intellectual capital (IC) research community, although until recently 
virtually no attention had been paid to documenting its fate during the intervening 
years. 
The accounting academy’s enthusiasm for narrative reporting is not difficult to 
understand. Comfortably removed from the challenges of actually having to report, 
the benefits of extending the role of narratives in financial statements continue to be 
self-evident to many academics. The absence of a reciprocal attitude among 
practitioners is both well-documented and understood. Its advocates sincerely 
believe that, in due course, a greater emphasis on narratives will prevail, and to the 
benefit of all stakeholders. In this scenario it may be that IR will be the initiative that 
provides the crucial turning point. According to the same logic, this might have 
previously been asserted in connection with the ICS. However, in the absence of 
much empirical evidence on the fate of the ICS since 2002, it has been possible for 
those promoting extended narrative reporting to remain very positive about its future 
trajectory, whether within IR or some subsequent development. The availability of 
such insights is therefore of significance to the narrative reporting debate  
In this paper we seek to document the failure of the ICS during the decade following 
the termination of the DGP. To date there has been no previous study of how the 
ICS fared during this period. A study of those companies that participated in the DGP 
initiative indicated that it had been at best only a very modest success, with only a 
small number of companies persevering with the ICS approach (see Nielsen et al, 
2016, 2017; Schaper, 2016). Our explanation is framed in the spirit of the political 
economy of accounting (PEA), as outlined in the seminal paper by Cooper and 
Sherer (1984), and is intended to be understood as a contribution to the tradition of 
critical accounting research. The lessons adduced from this explanatory exercise are 
advanced as a salutory reminder to advocates of narrative reporting of the deep 
seated obstacles that such developments face from an accountancy profession that 
is widely committed to furthering the interests of capital as principal stakeholder. In 
the interests of promoting beneficial change, attention is also devoted to how it might 
be possible to promote narrative reporting, whether in the context of IR or IC, or 
indeed other counter-mainstream initiatives. 
The choice of Cooper and Sherer’s PEA as the framing theory for this paper is 
appropriate on a range of grounds. Initially it might be recalled that their paper, 
written as an early contribution to the embryonic critical accounting research 
literature, was itself focused on “corporate accounting reports”, which we understand 
would encompass both IR and the ICS. By contrast, a labour process perspective 
would not seem to offer the appropriate purchase, being concerned with how 
accounting, and management accounting in particular, is principally implicated in the 
social organisation of work (Roslender, 2017). A second alternative, in the guise of 
Critical Theory, is arguably more relevant to understanding the potential of more 
radical forms of ‘accounting’ such as intellectual (human) capital self-accounts, as 
characterised by Roslender and Fincham (2001, 2004; see also Roslender et al, 
2015). Beyond this set of critical perspectives there is a further number of framing 
theories, including structuration theory, governmentality theory and actor network 
theory, whose critical designation continues to be hotly debated. Their utility for this 
particular paper is regarded as being extremely limited, although appropriate for 
other enquiries, as is evident in Nielsen et al. (2017). 
In principle we are committed to the extension of narrative reporting within financial 
reporting, and indeed beyond it as appropriate. Unlike many others who advocate its 
extension, however, our motivation is not that of promoting ‘better’ accounting and 
reporting. We take it to be axiomatic that increased use of narrative holds out the 
promise of contributing to a better society or social betterment, if only in a relatively 
modest way. In this respect we view narrative reporting in a well-rehearsed way, 
through the lens of social accounting, understood as accounting to society as 
opposed to accounting to shareholders or accounting to managers. While 
acknowledging that a considerable part of the extant social accounting canon is only 
minimally critical in orientation or intent, the possibility of a more critical social 
accounting has been explored, for example, in the recent work of Cooper and her co-
authors (Cooper et al, 2005, 2011; Cooper and Coulson, 2014).          
The paper is organised as follows. The continuing interest in narrative reporting in 
the UK context is briefly reviewed in the following section, which also documents the 
current reaffirmation of its potential. In section three the DGP and its principal output, 
the ICS approach are discussed. The fourth section reports the key findings of a 
recent study of the fate of the ICS in the decade following the conclusion of the 
guideline project. These findings are understood here as having major significance 
for any initiative to extend narrative reporting and are subjected to a brief appraisal in 
section five. The concluding section embraces the three imperatives of critical 
accounting research identified in Cooper and Sherer (1984) to frame a critique of the 
prospects of extending narrative reporting practices within the prevailing social order.  
 
 2.  The continuing case for narrative reporting 
In an influential report on the development of narrative reporting practice in the UK1, 
Beattie et al (2004) present an optimistic picture suggesting that the breakthrough for 
which its advocates had been lobbying was imminent. They note that while UK public 
companies had provided narrative introductions to the annual report package for 
many years, an important step change was evident in the Accounting Standards 
Board’s 1993 recommendation that companies incorporate a narrative Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) within the package. A decade of successful OFR 
experimentation had informed a revised and extended set of OFR best practice 
guidelines (ASB, 2003). Complementing this were proposals from the UK 
government (DTI, 2004) designed to modernise company law, which included the 
incorporation of a greater extent of qualitative and forward-looking content within 
financial disclosures as a necessary addition to the predominantly quantitative, 
historical information that had predominated within corporate financial reporting. 
Beattie et al briefly document similar narrative statements that have been successful 
elsewhere, including the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) popular in 
North America, as well as drawing attention to an European Union initiative to 
require listed companies to file an Annual Registration Document. 
Beattie et al (2004) continue by noting that: 
“Given these developments, it seems fair to conclude that the narratives 
contained in corporate annual reports are now viewed by many influential 
organisations and groups as sharing (alongside traditional financial 
statements) the leading role in business reporting” (Beattie et al, 2004: 4).  
In so doing they link the promotion of extended narrative reporting with a move to a 
business reporting model of financial reporting, viewed as a successor to the 
prevailing corporate reporting model. The argument for a business reporting model 
dated back a decade to the findings of the Special Committee on Financial 
Reporting, often referred to as the Jenkins Committee, that proposed a 
comprehensive reformulation of financial reporting (AICPA, 1994; see also ICAS, 
1999). Although generally well-received by many influential stakeholders in the 
financial reporting arena, the iconoclastic emphases of the Jenkins Report resulted 
in its implementation being at best slow and quietly (although often successfully) 
contested by practitioners. However, Beattie et al were evidently confident that the 
next step change was imminent, with their own empirical study a timely, valuable 
contribution to the debate (see also Beattie et al, 2002; Rutherford, 2002). 
                                                          
1
 The UK is widely regarded as being in the vanguard of attempts to promote increased narrative reporting 
practice, hence the predominant UK-centric focus of this section of the paper. 
Looking beyond the understandable enthusiasm of academics who believed that 
their sincerely held convictions were soon about to be more widely embraced, it 
would seem that in 2004 there was a growing acceptance that narrative reporting 
was no longer to be viewed as a useful supplement to the predominantly quantitative 
annual report format. Instead it was rapidly gaining credibility as a valuable 
complement to the financial calculus that had served the accountancy profession for 
several generations. There was growing recognition that what the accountancy 
profession was engaged in in financial reporting, and much more beyond, was the 
telling of a story. The point had now been reached at which it was necessary to 
accept that not only was there a need to recognise that a different story was required 
as companies found themselves facing an ever more competitive operating 
environment. The manner in which the story was constituted needed to change too. 
No longer could it be accepted that it made sense to incorporate only a small number 
of contextualising, often vague and unaudited narratives within the annual report 
where words provided the better means of communicating this content. In 2004 it 
seemed as if there was powerful recognition that words furnished the best way of 
telling what were at least increasingly important parts of the story of successful 
business performance. 
On page 10 of The Coalition: our programme for government, under the broad 
heading “Business”, the following commitment is set out: 
“We will reinstate an Operating and Financial Review to ensure that 
directors’ social and environmental duties have to be covered in company 
reporting, and investigate further ways of improving corporate 
accountability and transparency” (HMSO, 2010: 10). 
This commitment was probably the work of the then Liberal Democrat Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, and members of his 
ministerial team, rather than their Conservative colleagues for whom such 
adventures are less palatable. The need to reinstate the OFR was the result of it 
being suddenly abandoned in late 2005 by the then Labour Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown. This followed a period of consultation with stakeholders 
culminating the passage of legislation in March 2005 imposing a statutory regulation 
requiring companies to incorporate an OFR within their annual financial statements. 
As Rowbottom and Schroeder (2014) documents, Brown’s motivations were largely 
political in nature, and evidenced a strong degree of miscalculation, with the Labour 
administration pursuing legislation in 2006 to introduce a requirement for a Business 
Review, framed in accordance with the detail of the EU Accounts Modernisation 
Directive, to be effective from 1 October 2007. Like the OFR this was a narrative 
report that covered much of the same ground as the abandoned enhancement, 
although accompanied by a less onerous auditing provision than was envisaged in 
2005. Much was made of the great similarities between the two narratives, as well as 
a suggestion that the changes were likely to prove temporary and valuable (see also 
Roslender and Stevenson, 2009). 
Within a couple of months of the Coalition taking office in May 2010, the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills published The Future of Narrative Reporting – A 
Consultation (BIS, 2010). The perceived importance of narrative reporting is evident 
in paragraph 1 of the executive summary, which states: 
“Narrative reporting in company annual reports has come a long way over 
the past 30 years. Good narrative reporting should tell the company’s 
story effectively and in a balanced way that puts financial information into 
context. The statutory reporting framework is intended to help boards 
consider material issues facing the business so that they can determine 
the right strategy for long term company success in the interests of 
company members. Social and environmental issues should be central to 
these discussions where they are relevant to the company’s strategy and 
long term success, as should discussion about pay and reward. 
Companies should then use the narrative in their reports to provide the 
material information on these issues to their shareholders.” (BIS, 2010: 6).  
In August 2013 the UK Parliament approved The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, which saw a relatively modest 
change in the requirements on companies despite the introduction of a new Strategic 
Report as a replacement for the former Business Review. The role of narrative 
reporting, as evidenced in the August 2010 consultation document and subsequent 
publications, continued to be affirmed although carefully balanced with a 
commitment to reduce the overall burden of reporting and kindred requirements on 
companies.  
Beyond the positive rhetoric, there is little evidence in the UK to believe that narrative 
reporting is held in any higher regard than it was a decade ago2. It is interesting to 
note that while the opening sentence of Beattie and Smith (2013) observes that 
narrative reporting is now firmly established as a crucial component of an annual 
report, it is the 2001 IASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of 
Financial Statements that is cited in support of this. A further indication that things 
may actually have regressed to some degree is evident in the following overview of 
the Management Commentary innovation published on the IFRS Foundation and 
IASB website:  
“On 8 December 2010 the IASB issued the IFRS practice statement 
Management Commentary. The practice statement provides a broad, non-
binding framework for the presentation of management commentary that 
relates to financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS. 
                                                          
2
 Following the return of a Conservative majority administration in the UK in May 2015 concerns were 
expressed that the provisions enacted in 2013, principally at the behest of their former Liberal Democrat 
partners in the previous administration, would remain a priority. The political upheaval attendant on the Brexit 
vote in June 2016 is highly unlikely to change this.  
The practice statement is not an IFRS. Consequently, entities are not 
required to comply with the practice statement, unless specifically 
required by their jurisdiction. 
Management commentary is a narrative report that provides a context 
within which to interpret the financial position, financial performance and 
cash flows of an entity. It also provides management with an opportunity 
to explain its objectives and its strategies for achieving those objectives.” 
(www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Management-
Commentary/Pages/Management-Commentary.aspx). 
We find this observation to be somewhat at odds with the assertion that narrative 
reporting “has come a long way over the past 30 years” (BIS, 2010:6). 
Another dimension to the story presented by Beattie et al (2004:16-20) is how the 
challenge of extending narrative reporting became entwined with the rise of IC and 
intangibles. The failure of the conventional financial reporting model to accommodate 
the growing stocks of these assets was identified as a further reason why the 
profession might look very closely at Jenkins’ thesis, a view previously expressed in 
Business Reporting – The Inevitable Change? of which Beattie was the editor (ICAS, 
1999). During the intervening years the search for robust IC reporting frameworks 
had continued, giving rise to a range of developments, amongst which was the DGP 
and its principal output, the ICS. 
In the context of the present paper, what is particularly significant about the DGP 
initiative is that it accorded narrative reporting a level of importance that arguably far 
outstripped anything discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is no exaggeration to 
assert that the DGP on IC reporting was, and remains, a leading example of the 
promise of narrative reporting. Although it may be possible to identify later, larger 
scale initiatives (Dumay and Roslender, 2013), none has yet attracted the level of 
critical approval accorded its principal output, the ICS. For these reasons we take the 
view that the fate of the DGP offers important lessons for anyone attracted to the 
idea that the future of financial reporting will accord a greater importance to the 
extension of narrative reporting. Whether in the guise of business reporting, reporting 
about business models or the currently fashionable IR development (BIS, 2011; 
IIRC, 2011, 2012, 2013; Beattie and Smith, 2013; Nielsen and Roslender, 2015), 
such initiatives entail a radical shift in paradigm to manifest parity between narrative 
and numbers within the annual report and beyond, the case for which remains highly 
contentious for many within practice. 
3.  The Danish Guideline Project 
In 1997 the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry (DATI) began to fund an IC 
reporting initiative with a substantial academic presence, directed by Jan Mouritsen 
and Per Nikolaj Bukh, which continued until late 2002. Unlike the previous wave of 
IC reporting frameworks such as the Skandia Navigator (Edvinsson, 1997) and the 
Intangible Assets Monitor (Sveiby, 1997), both of which exhibited similarities with 
Kaplan and Norton’s more generic Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 
1996) (see also subsequent developments including Lovingsson et al, 2000 and Lev, 
2001), the DGP sought to fashion an approach that was based in narratives rather 
than numbers (or a scoreboard). The first phase of the project, involving extensive 
collaboration with seventeen organisations, resulted in the dissemination of the ICS 
in 2000 (DATI, 2000). Phase two of the project, which involved working with 100 
organisations to demonstrate the utility of the ICS, concluded in December 2002 with 
the formulation of a refined approach underpinned by a “new guideline” (Mouritsen et 
al, 2003).  
An indication of how radical the DGP was from the outset can be seen in the 
following characterisation of an ICS: 
“[An ICS] forms an integral part of working with knowledge management 
within a company. It reports on the company’s efforts to obtain, develop, 
share and anchor the knowledge resources required to ensure future 
results......can contribute to creating value for the company by improving 
the basis for growth, flexibility and innovation. Its merits lie in expressing 
the company’s strategy for what it must excel at in order to deliver 
satisfactory products or services.” (DATI, 2000: 14). 
Little in these sentences resonates with the traditional terminology associated with 
the corporate reporting approach to financial reporting, although it does align with 
several of the themes evident in the pages of the Jenkins Report (AICPA, 1994) and 
later discussions of the attractions of a new business reporting approach to financial 
reporting, e.g. Wallman (1995, 1996, 1997), ICAS (1999) and Upton (2001).  
While IC has not disappeared since 2003, the resources and focus devoted to 
identifying how best to account for it are not what they once were. There have been 
major new issues for the financial reporting community to engage since this time, 
inter alia the need to respond to Enron and kindred financial crises, as a result of 
which it is difficult to identify any significant advances in IC reporting since 2003. A 
number of recent reviews of IC accounting research (e.g., Alcaniz et al, 2011; 
Guthrie et al, 2012; Dumay and Roslender, 2013) observe that the greater part of 
sustained research interest in the IC phenomenon has focused on documenting 
extant reporting practice and resulting in a growing body of empirical literature. This 
has been accompanied by a reduction in theorising about IC, an absence recognised 
in the latter reviews (and beyond), and accompanied by calls for a more critical 
engagement with IC in the future (Dumay and Garanina, 2013; see also Roslender et 
al, 2015).  
The first guideline, published in 2000, proposed a three element model characterised 
by an emphasis upon narrative rather than numbers, in contrast to the growing range 
of IC scoreboard reporting frameworks identified above. The most fundamental 
element was a knowledge narrative, in which a company documents how it intends 
to utilise its stock of knowledge resources to create the products and services 
(market offerings) required by its customers. The knowledge narrative should also 
incorporate the company’s mission and values, as in a conventional strategy 
statement, indicating the implicit strategic underpinnings of any ICS. To a significant 
extent this emphasis, like the narrative attribute, reflected the role that knowledge 
management thinking had on key members of the project team. The emergence of 
the knowledge management field in the mid-1990s (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Davenport and Prusak, 1997) predates that of IC (management) by a couple of 
years, and provides a complementary set of insights to those associated with 
‘intangibles’. As a result the guideline project was always destined to be rather more 
inclusive in emphasis that those that immediately preceded it.  
The second element of an ICS is termed management challenges. These are 
derived from the knowledge narrative and identify the key activities that are required, 
involving the utilisation of four generic knowledge resources: employees; customers; 
processes; and technology, in the pursuit of the successful value creation as 
identified in the knowledge narrative. It is these activities that are to be continually 
monitored over time, making use of relevant indicators to report performance. The 
third element is termed reporting and refers to how performance is reported within 
the ICS. In this context the project team envisaged incorporating a measure of 
scoreboarding through the use of financial and non-financial indicators to 
communicate outcomes. However, these data would be complemented by the 
incorporation of a range of more unfamiliar (to accountants) visualisations, selected 
for their individual relevance and their contribution to providing as complete a picture 
of performance as possible. As with many constituents of the new management 
accounting (Kaplan, 1994, 1995; Roslender, 1995), of which the ICS is a further 
example, what is being commended by way of ‘accounting’ poses a major challenge 
to more traditional and conventional examples of that practice. 
The second phase of the project began in early 2001, now under the auspices of the 
Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation (DMSTI). It involved working 
with 100 companies (plus two consulting organisations who acted as facilitators) to 
trial the guideline with the intention of developing a more refined version over the 
next couple of years. A number of the original seventeen companies continued to 
participate but most were new to the project. The outcome was the development of a 
“new” guideline as outlined in Intellectual Capital Statements – The New Guideline 
(Mouritsen et al, 2003). The principal advance was that a further element was 
identified in the form of initiatives, being inserted between management challenges 
and reporting. The project team also took the opportunity to refine their overall 
thinking, as a consequence of which the knowledge narrative now placed more 
emphasis on articulating how knowledge resources were to be tailored towards 
successful value creation and the delivery of use value to users. Management 
challenges were now represented as identifying the specific knowledge resources 
required for value creation, especially those that needed to be acquired by the 
company or strengthened. The new element, initiatives, is concerned with the 
specifics of meeting recognised management challenges, i.e., more operational 
actions within the medium to long term projections underpinning the knowledge 
narrative and management challenges. Reporting became retitled indicators, 
acknowledging that the entire statement was in effect concerned with reporting, with 
the final element assuming a more conventional character – the identification of 
relevant metrics that demonstrated how successful (or otherwise) the company had 
been in meeting its management challenges through action. The contribution of a 
wider portfolio of visualisations was affirmed, thereby reinforcing the perceived 
radical nature of the ICS.  
Conscious of the challenges of implementing the ICS approach the project team was 
rather equivocal about how this might be possible. It was certainly understood that at 
the extreme it might be possible to combine the statement with more conventional 
reporting approaches that would thereby increase in length. A reduced ICS might be 
incorporated within the extant financial statement package and be subject to scrutiny 
by the audit profession, whose representatives had participated in the project from its 
inception. Alternatively, there was the option of publishing a stand-alone ICS that 
might include a reduced financial report. There was no appetite in 2002 for 
introducing a mandatory requirement for IC reporting, however, thereby 
necessitating a voluntary disclosure arrangement. More significantly, what was 
reported was at the discretion of companies that elected to report, providing 
whatever information they chose to publish. The 2002 Financial Statements Act did 
require large private companies to provide information on about their knowledge 
resources (=IC), where these were adjudged to be important in relation to future 
earnings. In effect this permitted even large companies to opt out of IC disclosure 
with a degree of impunity. A second act, in 2005, required those companies that 
were prepared to acknowledge the importance of IC to provide information on their 
IC resources in the management commentary section of the annual report, perhaps 
by means of some form of ICS. 
4.  A decade of progress?      
Despite its various merits as an IC reporting framework, the fate of the ICS approach 
has attracted little follow-up research, resulting in a significant gap in the IC literature 
(Rimmel et al, 2004, 2012 provide notable exceptions). The authors were conscious 
that the ICS may not have become the success that its advocates had envisaged but 
lacked any evidence of this and consequently they were unable to offer informed 
statements to support or challenge their perceptions. An opportunity to address this 
situation presented itself in late 2012, a decade after the DGP was terminated. In the 
present paper it is taken as axiomatic that the fate of the ICS has a broader 
significance than simply being an interesting development in the history of Danish 
financial reporting. Such was the promise asserted for the ICS approach, and its 
narrative credentials in particular, it might legitimately be viewed as providing a major 
test bed for the prospects for any substantial extension of narrative reporting 
practices. 
The initial step in the research project was to identify and establish contact with as 
many of the DGP companies as possible. Around 100 companies were known to 
have participated in one or both phases of the guideline project, including the two 
facilitator companies. Fifty four companies were eventually identified as existing in a 
form close to that assumed a decade or so ago. By contrast 16 had either ceased to 
exist or could not be traced, with the remaining 32 having evolved in some way, 20 
having been subject to merger activity. In total it proved possible to make contact, 
usually by telephone or email, with 128 individuals who had some involvement with 
ICS activity between 1997 and 2013, half of whom agreed to participate in a full 
telephone interview relating to this activity. Of these only 18 remained with their 
employers as between 1997-2002, while 14 had only had some involvement with 
ICS activity after 2002. Overall, given the technical difficulties entailed constructing 
such a sample, a notional 63% response rate is adjudged a considerable 
achievement (see Nielsen et al, (2017) for a fuller exposition of the broader research 
project). 
In the case of the most fundamental question, the extent of ICS activity, it proved 
possible to elicit a larger number of responses, 78 in total of whom 54 indicated that 
they did not continue to produce ICSs following the termination of their involvement 
with the guideline project. Fourteen respondents claimed not to have produced a 
single complete ICS, while overall the average number of statements claimed to 
have been produced was marginally less than two. On this evidence it would appear 
that in practice the guideline project was something of a failure. Only seven 
companies claimed to have produced six or more statements, with four of these at or 
close to double figures.  
When asked about motivations for participating in the project, internal interest was 
identified as being of more importance than perceptions of external pressure. There 
was evidence of a recognition that IC reporting might be of use to management in 
over two thirds of companies, mention being made of the pressing need to engage 
with knowledge management issues, including human resource management issues. 
In this context it is interesting to note that human resource professionals formed the 
single largest grouping among the 64 respondents who agreed to the request for a 
full telephone interview. The enthusiasm of particular individuals was commonly 
identified as a key driver of interest in IC and IC reporting practices during the 
guideline project. By contrast, external pressures seemed to be experienced more in 
the case of public sector organisations.  
Responses to questions on the foci of ICS activity indicate that employees attracted 
the most attention, by a considerable margin and far in excess of the other three 
generic knowledge resources identified by the project. This was previously 
commented on in both Bukh et al (2001) and Mouritsen et al. (2003). One possible 
explanation of this finding is that such information might already have existed in a 
form that made it relatively easy to re-present within the ICS framework.  
The responsibility for producing ICSs lay with a variety of different individuals and 
functions, although over half the responses identified some form of medium sized 
interdisciplinary group. The finance function (accountants?) did not appear to 
assume substantial responsibility for these tasks, in contrast to human resource 
management professionals who were often reasonably active. Forty six per cent of 
respondents believed that ICS activity was principally for internal purposes, with a 
third identifying external purposes, the remainder being of the view that it was used 
for both purposes in their experience.  
Despite the very modest impact that the ICS appears to have had at the corporate 
level, only a quarter of respondents believed the experience, however short lived, 
was of no benefit. In terms of positive outcomes, it was once again in relation to 
employees that the ICS proved positive. Other benefits mentioned related to creating 
a better awareness of resource issues and, more surprisingly, enhanced external 
perceptions of performance. These impressions were in contrast to the views 
expressed when respondents were asked whether they believed that the ICS had 
embedded itself within companies in some way, despite its general disappearance 
very quickly after the end of the guideline project itself. There seemed to be only 
limited evidence to suggest that this did occur, being essentially restricted to a small 
number of cases where companies began to develop their own guidelines. 
Sustained ICS activity 
Seven companies were identified in the course of the first round of interviews as 
having continued to work with the ICS concept for a relatively lengthy period after the 
termination of the guideline project. Three were publicly owned companies, two 
privately owned with one having moved from being publicly owned into private 
ownership in 2008, the seventh company moving in the opposite direction in 2005. 
Five of the seven intimated that they were still involved in producing ICSs, one 
having ceased to do so in 2010, the other as recently as 2012. One of the 
companies, a public sector IT provider privatised in 2008, provided two respondents, 
one who had been involved since 2000, the second having exited the company’s 
programme after five years, in 2004, although remaining within the corporate 
communications department (see Nielsen et al. 2016 for a fuller account of the 
activities of these seven companies).  
In response to questions about why these companies initially became involved in the 
guideline project, there was a general consensus that they did not feel unduly 
pressurised to do so by external forces. Affirming a point made previously about the 
role of individuals in promoting the project, three respondents identified themselves 
as having assumed an enthusiastic championing role. In addition, and again 
reinforcing previous observations, two respondents commented on the value that the 
publication of IC information had in respect of recruiting the type of employees that 
the company was more interested in. The information in question also extended 
beyond that on human resource issues to matters of sustainability and corporate 
social responsibility. There was also a measure of confirmation that, despite the 
accountancy profession having representation within the guideline project team, this 
did not translate to a local level, as evidenced previously by the dispersion of ICS 
practice across a range of management functions in the broader sample. 
For the most part, similar motivations seemed to explain why this group had 
persevered with IC reporting over time. Several respondents raised the idea of the 
ICS being an example of a management fashion, although not in a negative way. 
This would seem to suggest that such practices worked for them if not the generality 
of companies, whose experiences there seemed to be a general unawareness of (or 
little concern for).  
Further questioning provided evidence that ICS practice had evolved in a variety of 
ways over time. Five of the companies had refined their ICS activity, particularly in 
respect of the human capital component. A consulting engineering company had 
continued to incorporate a reduced ICS within its annual report that was now 
principally focused on employee information, while two companies had rebranded 
their ICS: a utilities company now provided a “Knowledge and Organization” 
statement, which it continued to incorporate in its annual report and which again was 
predominantly concerned with human capital information; and an administration 
services company had also reconceptualised its ICS as its “Strategy Plan”, in which 
it documented a range of employee matters including investment in human capital. A 
municipality followed the project guidelines for a couple of years before moving 
towards the development of a report that focused solely on employee matters. 
Working with external consultants, a turbine manufacturer had revitalised its ICS 
activity in 2006, now publishing a detailed statement of IC resources that also 
appeared in a reduced form within the annual report, with emphasis on technology 
and employees. A second utilities company had also persevered with the ICS, 
presented as a stand-alone document for a number of years, before deciding to 
combine IC reporting with environmental reporting in the new mandatory corporate 
social responsibility report.  
Of the seven companies, it is an IT provider that has continued to embrace the spirit 
of 2002 most closely, initially publishing a range of IC information while linking 
managerial rewards to success in growing stocks of IC. After several years the 
company moved towards a strategic annual reporting approach that retained many 
of the attributes of narrative based IC reporting, all of which was subject to the 
scrutiny of the audit profession, as intended within the guideline project. It may not 
be without significance that this company attracted critical acclaim for its IC-related 
practices in the early days, nor that it was this company that provided the two 
respondents for interview. Many within the original project guideline team will 
appreciate the continued evolution of their ideas and objectives, even on such a 
modest basis as seems to be evident from this study. Equally, the evidence that a 
focus on employees/human capital seems to have become firmly intertwined with the 
pursuit of IC reporting also brings its own rewards perhaps. Although not all 
contributors to the early body of IC literature from the mid-1990s sought to privilege 
the human capital component, some were less inclined to disguise their allegiances, 
including Edvinsson (1997) and Roslender and Fincham (2001). For them, any 
coherent attempt to account for people, however modest, holds out the prospect of a 
realisation that in the last analysis it is employees that provide the key to the 
sustained creation and delivery of value to customers, society and shareholders 
alike.    
 
5.  Contextualising ‘failure’ 
By any criterion, these findings indicate that the DGP was only minimally successful, 
a finding at odds with the acclaim that the ICS continues to attract among some 
sections of the IC community. The decision to abruptly terminate the initiative late in 
2002 might suggest it was already faultering, although a sizeable number of 
respondents commented that in their own experience companies were not subjected 
to undue pressure to participate in the project, which was recognised to have 
exhibited many merits at the time, some of which still pertain. Conversely, there is 
some substance to the possibility that a loss of advocacy on the part of enthusiastic 
champions for the ICS played a crucial role in the project’s failure. Irrespective of 
their commitment to the initiative, these individuals possibly had insufficient time to 
ensure that the ICS, or some related development, became firmly embedded within 
companies and/or too little opportunity to train their own successors before they 
themselves progressed in their own careers.  
A less sympathetic assessment of the fate of the guideline project is that it provides 
further evidence for the need to be sceptical about the enthusiasm that academics 
regularly display for matters that are of a fundamentally practical nature. Beyond a 
cluster of academic papers, upon which careers were built or advanced (or both), 
what remains of the guideline project a decade or so later? In the process valuable 
resources, both financial and of time, have been squandered, not least by those 
companies who, in good faith, were prepared to participate in it. A more pointed 
observation might be that the project team took a new product to the market and, on 
the basis of evidence collected in this study, found it wanting. Indeed, the initiative 
proved so unsuccessful that there has been little or no enthusiasm in the interim to 
develop a further improved approach, which tells its own story. 
Johanson and Henningsson (2007) documents the widespread alarm and concern 
evident in middle 1990s in a number of global agencies attendant on the continued 
increase in the “hidden value” within organisations, by that time largely attributable to 
IC or intangibles (Edvinsson, 1997). The inability of the prevailing financial 
accounting and reporting paradigm to accommodate this was recognised as having 
the potential to seriously disrupt the smooth workings of the global capital market, 
giving rise to the prospect of widespread, inefficient utilisation of scarce financial 
resources. At the limit, although not always articulated, was the possibility of a 
serious challenge to the continued reproduction of the capitalist order, at that time 
rapidly beginning to move into a globalisation phase. At a local level, the Danish 
government was conscious of the need to fully exploit its potential as a knowledge 
society. Beyond the rhetoric associated with this and similar notions such as the 
information society or economy, was the fact that such societies were likely to be 
even more reliant on their intellectual capital assets than larger, currently more 
successful societies, in the medium to long term. Consequently there was a double 
pressure to identify reliable ways of accounting for IC and to do so quickly. The 
establishment of the guideline project team was a necessity as much as it was a bold 
initiative, the investment in its activities between 1997 and 2002 one that it would 
have been a dereliction of the Danish government’s duty to have declined to pursue.  
In parallel, the IC phenomenon was recognised to have major significance in the 
context of the debate about the benefits of moving from a corporate reporting to a 
business reporting model of financial reporting. Following the publication of the 
findings of the Jenkins Committee’s deliberations on this question (AICPA, 1994), 
enthusiasm for the development of a more inclusive emphasis within financial 
disclosure practice began to gather pace. The failure of corporate reporting to 
satisfactorily accommodate the growth of IC, principally on the grounds of the 
difficulties these assets posed for the financial valuation calculus, something already 
evident for intangible assets but now magnified many times, was invoked as a further 
reason to begin to pursue the search for a new paradigm. The English Institute’s 
New Reporting Models for Business (ICAEW, 2003) provides a comprehensive 
overview of the debates to that time. A key point of contact between the business 
reporting and the IC reporting debates was that both largely took for granted the 
necessity to develop and report information that was characterised more by its 
relevance for users, whose numbers were also growing, rather than its reliability, 
previously the most critical attribute of financial information. The emergence of a 
growing portfolio of scoreboard frameworks for IC reporting further emphasised the 
utility of information characterised more by its relevance than its reliability. Equally, 
the rise of IC underlined the importance of seeking to emphasise a measure of future 
orientation within business reporting, something evident within the ICS. 
While the challenge posed by IC had not disappeared by 2002, the financial 
environment had become less volatile and thereby less worrying. Some of the heavy 
turbulence experienced in the later 1990s had subsided following the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble around the millennium. Equally, there was evidence that despite the 
absence of any mandatory IC reporting requirements, companies had begun to 
develop mechanisms for communicating information about the IC-related activity to 
analysts and the broader financial community, who were thereby able to meet many 
of the needs of their client portfolios (Holland, 2009, 2006, 2003; Barker et al. 2012; 
Roberts et al. 2006). Taking a broader view, and with the benefit of hindsight, it 
would appear that the calm conservatism for which the accountancy profession is 
widely renowned had once again shown itself to be a safe option, albeit perhaps only 
fleetingly given the looming threat posed as a consequence of its involvement in the 
Enron and related financial scandals.   
A decade later the accountancy profession has largely restored its collective 
credibility, suitably chastened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. The profession fared 
well during the global financial crisis, which saw bankers cast as the villains of the 
piece (Laux and Leuz, 2009). Having ridden out the storm, the time to revisit the 
case for a greater role for narrative reporting within financial statements may have 
come around again, with advocates from within the academy, government, the 
accountancy bodies and sections of industry and commerce prepared to promote the 
requisite debates. In this milieu the paper by Beattie and Smith (2013) might be 
recognised as demonstrating that things have returned to what they were a decade 
ago, with the accountancy profession now being in a better position to make the 
necessary progress in extending the role for and significance of narrative reporting.   
6.  Lessons for the future of narrative reporting 
In an early seminal contribution to the critical accounting literature, Cooper and 
Sherer (1984) identify the three imperatives that constitute the kernel of the PEA 
perspective for critical accounting research. These same imperatives applied (and 
continue to apply) equally to two alternative generic critical accounting approaches 
that, in parallel, were attracting the attention of a growing number of UK accounting 
academics, many associated with the University of Sheffield, namely labour process 
theory (or analysis) and Critical Theory. The first imperative Cooper and Sherer 
identify is to be “explicitly normative”, which requires the researcher to reject any 
pretensions of value neutrality in pursuing research. Critical accounting research is 
an engaged praxis that requires its proponents to be open about their values, and 
inter alia their political positions. The second imperative is to be “descriptive”, which 
despite the unfortunate terminology commends the extension of studies of 
‘accounting in action’ within a broad social scientific framework, at that time loosely 
identifiable as being underpinned by an interpretive methodology. The final 
imperative is that of being “critical”, which translates into a commitment to 
demonstrate the (then) largely obscured contestable foundations of contemporary 
accounting theory and practice. Where possible, Cooper and Sherer urge critical 
accountants to complement the new understanding of accounting practices with 
alternatives that are more aligned with the priorities of a fundamentally different 
social order.  
As we noted in the introduction, this paper is not motivated by any pretensions of 
objectivity or value neutrality, being firmly aligned with the normative imperative 
commended within PEA. The authors are supportive of the various attempts to 
develop IC reporting frameworks, including the ICS approach, on the grounds that 
the such initiatives ultimately would seem to hold out the prospect of providing 
employees with a greater opportunity to develop an emancipatory accounting praxis. 
After Roslender and Fincham (2001) they recognise that the human capital 
component of IC constitutes its primary component, thereby meriting the designation 
of primary IC (see also Roslender and Fincham 2004; Roslender et al., 2015). The 
challenge to critical accounting researchers is to work in tandem with employees 
(human capital) in the development and diffusion of its own self accounts in the form 
of narratives designed to demonstrate the primary role of labour within the value 
creation and delivery process. It follows by the same logic that the authors are in 
principle supportive of the initiative to develop the narrative turn in reporting. 
However, also being motivated by the critical imperative they distance themselves 
from the position that either or both IC and narrative reporting are to be understood 
as providing a means to pursue better accounting, and are committed to fashioning 
interventions that explicitly seek to couple alternative accountings with the promotion 
of social betterment. In this regard it is viewed as axiomatic that the interests served 
by the prevailing corporate reporting approach to financial reporting, as practised by 
the global accountancy profession, are overwhelmingly those of shareholders, and 
principally institutional shareholders. Although business reporting, envisaged as a 
desirable successor to corporate reporting by many of its proponents between 1994 
and 2003, acknowledged the needs of other interested parties, it did so in a largely 
unchallenging way. In a similar manner history would seem to be repeating itself in 
the context of IR, which despite its social reporting underpinnings, not to mention its 
acknowledgement of the importance of both IC and narrative reporting and 
disclosure, appears to be very largely the captive of traditional stakeholders (Flower, 
2015).  
Within the financial reporting community there are many researchers who are 
sincere in their belief that the promotion of enhanced narrative reporting is both 
desirable and beneficial to society. Consequently, they are comfortable to invest their 
time and energy commending it to the accountancy profession. For our own part, it 
would be short sighted to simply dismiss such developments and initiatives as 
lacking in any merit for anyone interested in the pursuit of social betterment within 
the accounting research community. Nevertheless, what the various insights 
collected in the course of the DGP study, an initiative within which experimentation 
with narrative reporting was extensive, reaffirmed for us are a number of major 
obstacles that remain to challenge any extension of narrative reporting practices. It is 
therefore incumbent on us to contribute these insights to the rejuvenated debate 
about extending narrative reporting briefly reviewed earlier in the paper. In doing so, 
we regard the remainder of the paper as enacting Cooper and Sherer’s third, 
“critical” imperative, albeit largely without recourse to the lexicon that is sometimes 
enrolled in such analyses.       
Securing practitioner buy-in 
A key finding of the DGP study was that the accounting and finance function did not 
appear greatly interested in taking responsibility for ICS activity, in contrast to some 
of their human resource management colleagues. While it is possible to debate 
whether the guideline project was an accounting initiative, many involved in driving it 
between 1997 and 2002 held this view, including representatives from the Danish 
auditing profession. At the local level different agendas continue to prevail, despite 
the observation that ‘relevance’, understood as a qualitative characteristic of financial 
reporting, is now regarded as being of fundamental importance alongside ‘faithful 
representation’ (IASB, 2010). For most practitioners relevance equates with the 
added value of an initiative commended to them (in good faith) by third parties. In the 
absence of any specific requirement to implement changes, the prospects for 
success of such developments as IC reporting or the generality of narrative reports 
are likely to remain limited. To some degree this state of affairs demonstrates the 
power that the ranks of backwoodsmen within the accountancy profession continue 
to wield. Of more significance perhaps is a characteristic duplicity on the part of the 
professional accountancy bodies, who readily position themselves as willing 
participants in the policy debate but less given to leadership in respect of actual 
implementation. For the very greatest part, the individuals who populate these 
powerful leadership positions evidence little inclination to challenge the prevailing 
axiom that the principal purpose of financial reporting is to secure and perpetuate the 
interests of shareholders. Only those initiatives that promise to enhance these 
interests are truly desirable and thereby merit commendation to the practitioner 
community.  
A challenge to accountancy’s jurisdiction 
For the greater part of its history accounting has evolved, or has been developed, as 
a practice firmly based on ‘counting’, understood in a broader sense that we identify 
with the term quantitative. Consequently, it is possible to characterise accounting as 
the generic practice of telling the story of enterprise performance using numbers. In 
the case of financial accounting and reporting, these are for the most part financial 
numbers, reflecting the monetary measurement convention. This also extends to 
cost accounting and some aspects of management accounting, although over the 
past three decades managerial accounting, identified as the provision of accounting 
information to management, as agents of the owners, has seen a progressive 
decoupling of the financial from the quantitative. Such moves in the direction of 
recounting have often attracted the support of accounting academics, particularly 
where they have resulted in a greater degree of relevance within accounting 
information and understood to advance the interests of shareholders. From a 
jurisdictional perspective, however, developments such as the ICS or extended 
narrative reporting promote concern or alarm, since they threaten the exclusivity of 
the profession’s traditional value proposition. A longstanding facility with and mastery 
of numbers is now under threat of dilution as greater credibility is afforded telling the 
story of business performance using both words and numbers, a process that 
portends an increased inclusivity of practice. Human resource management 
specialists were not alone in assuming an active role in the, admittedly limited, 
diffusion of the ICS. The accountancy profession is likely to work to secure its own 
interests every bit as enthusiastically as it can be relied upon to promote those of its 
principal patrons.      
 Combatting continuing myths 
Few advocates for increased narrative reporting would dispute that it will result in 
reduced disclosures. Information overload has long been part of the repertoire of the 
financial reporting community when faced with calls for further disclosures, as a 
consequence of which many, if not most, practitioners are likely to be predisposed to 
reject the case for narrative reporting. While a commonsense case might be 
advanced to substantiate information overload in relation to individual shareholders, 
it overlooks the fact that analysts have long made use of their own information sets, 
customised and finely tuned to complement publicly available information. Indeed it 
might be argued that analysts would welcome further disclosures, at least those with 
some substance, since they promise to make their own work less onerous. Herein 
may lie the hidden agenda of the information overload objection: a lack of 
enthusiasm for pursuing new disclosure pathways that will inevitably require 
challenging new learning and increased risk, and a preference for institutionalised 
occupational conservatism (cf Holland and Johanson (2003)). 
Complementing the information overload objection is the claim that further 
disclosures, whether narrative or numerical, threatens to compromise the 
competitive position of the firm. This is often argued to be especially pertinent for 
disclosures that are forward-looking in content, an attribute that would seem to 
resonate with the implicit nature of narrative disclosures. This argument is premised 
on the contestable assumption that competitors continue have very little information 
about or insights on each other. In the case of large companies, however, not to be 
well apprised of the activities of competitors nowadays makes commercial bad 
sense. The benchmarking literature, for example, highlights the existence of 
cooperative activity designed to assist competitors to learn from each other, not least 
in order that an industry as a whole is better able to offer ever higher levels of 
customer service (Boxwell, 1994). Finally, the identification of a tendency to 
‘boilerplating’ as a response to unnecessary (=unwelcome) extensions of disclosure 
activity says rather more about the accountancy profession than third parties who 
seek to modernise its outlook.  
The imperative of making action mandatory 
The decision to not make the use of some form of ICS after 2002 mandatory is a 
further episode in the failure of regulatory authorities to embrace a ‘strong’ stance on 
promoting change in the financial reporting space. The decision to allow smaller 
companies to opt out completely was justified on familiar grounds, namely the 
disproportionate cost of such an exercise for relatively modest enterprises. In the 
case of larger entities, the DGP provision that allowed senior management to assert 
that such disclosures are an inappropriate imposition gifted a license to behave 
disingenuously should they so choose. The prospects for the effective policing of 
such misrepresentations were inevitably extremely limited, with the regulatory 
agency and their government sponsors operating on a basis of trust, for which there 
seems to be limited supportive historical evidence. Mandatory disclosure 
complemented by a rigorous enforcement and monitoring regime would have 
signalled serious intent, as would not tolerating the pursuit of a ‘tick box’ mentality on 
the part of practitioners. The traditional model of reliance on goodwill in response to 
voluntary models of disclosure, inter alia in the case of those that promise/threaten to 
advance the interests of a much wider set of stakeholders, remains inherently and 
unconscionably flawed.  
These are not new observations. Unfortunately, most advocates of extended 
narrative reporting, like their counterparts around the ICS, would appear to wish to 
cling to the assumption that those whose role it is to breathe life into self-evident 
improvements to practice will be swayed by arguments advanced by well-informed 
and equally sincere third parties, among whom accounting academics number many. 
This seems to be an unlikely proposition given the continuing imbalance of power 
that exists within the global accountancy profession, however. The more fruitful 
strategy would seem to be to install and lobby radical governments, since they alone 
have the power to put into place mandatory reporting requirements with which the 
accountancy profession will be required to comply. A formidable challenge without 
doubt but one that the critical accounting community should continue to embrace.   
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